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The High Technology 
on Cooperative Business 
(Reflections in Microeconomics) 
Jaroslav Jirdsek 
Studies in cooperative ventures disclosed a particular frequency of research and manu- 
facturing alliances in the "high" segment of contemporary technologies. 
It is in this setting where inter-firm efforts flourish, such as joint perfectioning of design 
and methods, mutual assistance in the development of competitive advantages, horizontal 
collaborative schemes (e.g., interfirm networking, satellite relationship), unification of 
technical concepts, standards or certificates, computer integrated interfirm information 
and logistics, and final producer's and subcontractor's endeavor in continuous business 
improvement. 
Cooperative models in high technology manufacturing challenge the theoretical ortho- 
doxy. Many empirical findings do not correspond with established theories. Conventional 
conclusions appear ambiguous. 
Attempts have therefore been undertaken to explain the proliferation of cooperative 
interfirm behavior on a new theoretical basis. 
Preludes to High Technology 
The advent of a new core technologies has been signalled by a remarkable shift from the 
dependence on material inputs in the past to "low mass and energy" processes since the 
second half of 1970s. 
1.1 "Capital saving" technologies 
It was the first oil shock (1972) that triggered profound changes in industrial technology.' 
An unprecedented breed of technologies proliferated, reducing the input per unit of fuel, 
raw materials and produces that became scarce and expensive. 
Subsequent changes in the logic of industrial production growth could not be inter- 
preted without alterations within the comforting orthodox body of theoretical knowledge. 
Empirical data supported the challenging conclusions facing the industrial economic 
theory. During the decade 1975-1985, they were particularly responsible for advanced 
industrialism. They prompted a search for alternative technologies and economic struc- 
tures and displayed a staggering transformation of the industrial growth pattern: they 
'Led by the OPEC crude price boom, other countries supplying primary commodities (most of them 
still developing) acceded to the price alliance. Between 1974 and 1979 world exports rose in volume and 
price: for crude oil, 128% and 211%; for aluminum, 111% and 207%; for copper, 118% and 206%, for 
cotton, 116% and 138%; and for coffee, 112% and 281%. Source: M. Radetzki, A Guide to Primary 
Commodities in the World Economy, Appendiz, Oxford, 1990. B. Blackwell, Comparisons for Later 
Years, forthcoming. 
achieved an increase of the industrial output at 140% while maintaining fuel, power, and 
raw material input at 104%.2 
It may be questioned inasmuch this change has been brought about by genuine cap- 
ital savings (e.g., adaptation to increased expenditures of industrial inputs by reducing 
the consumption of its material components), or by a redirected and augmented capi- 
tal utilization (through technical perfection, enhanced quality, better market placement, 
and price in~rease) .~  In the end, as a number of scholars put it, industry adjusted to 
higher raw material and energy cost as it had several decades ago (after the extensive 
mechanization) absorbed higher wages. 
Prior to the reversal of the input-output mechanism, it has been assumed that the 
growth of power and raw material input was to antecede and overtake the growth of 
production output .4 
time 
The very malleability of technology engendered a range of alternative technical, or- 
ganizational and structural possibilities. A profusion of research and experimentations 
divulged non-conventional comparative advantages and opened an unconventional frame- 
work of national and global competitiveness. A new kind of comparative advantage arose: 
a dominance of permanent change, and a more structural and functional advantage than 
simple and temporal cost-benefit competitive edge. 
As a result, not only adjustment to changed conditions of fuel, power, raw material 
and supply, as well as a more powerful leverage of economic growth, grew to a topical 
issue of theoretical thought. The revitalized industrial practice required new explanatory 
ideas that were not conceived in the past. 
In the aftermath of this industrial transformation, the conventional explanations were 
subsequently downplayed as empirical findings appeared differing from the model which 
rendered the current models invalid. For the first time after decades, theory ceased 
to elucidate the course of industrial development. Conservative formulations, though 
convenient in use, precluded it from assimilating with the changed pattern of industrial 
growth. 
'OECD Yearbooks, 1980, 1988, Paris. Data based on constant US$. 
3Both contributions in diverse proportions may be traced back to the industrial development after the 
1970s. While savings prevailed in earlier period, later, on the contrary, offensive marketing associated 
with product/service improvements gained momentum. Let us once again compare selected primary 
growth between 1977 and 1987 in physical and price volume: for crude oil, 70% and 101%; for copper, 
118% and 106%; for cotton, 13% and 141%; and for coffee, 152% and 80%. And from 1980 to 1987: for 
crude oil, 76% and 46%, for aluminum, 143% and 150%; for copper, 113% and 62%; for cotton, 108% 
and 100%; and for coffee, 119% and 80%. In all these comparisons, a volatile character of world prices is 
to be taken into consideration. Per year figures may oscillate along a sliding average. 
41n centrally planned economies developed along the Marxist thought, the priority of heavy industry 
was an imperative "iron law" of economic development. Key emphasis was placed to overtake steel 
production and power infrastructure, both in terms of time and volume, which affected decisively the 
program of industrialization and loaded it with excessive capital investments with a slow pay-back cycle. 
1.2 From capital saving to "capital displacement" 
Technologies developed in order to surmount the material input stress in industrial pro- 
duction passed on to a new class of technologies. The gradual reduction of "mass and 
energy" component reached a rather qualified number of industries a break-even point 
after which the capital saving turned around to capital di~placement.~ 
Several empirical studies support the findings of the conversion of capital from the sole 
driving force of economic growth to an intermediating and catalyst factor of economic 
growth. Studies of microelectronics and associated technical breakthroughs proved that 
industrial growth was accomplished with decreased capital investment .6 Another source 
of cognitive knowledge which could be brought to attention was the study of the "Silicon 
Valley" phenomenon7 which dispelled the conceivement that remarkable growth capital 
instillment or territorial "genius loci" were solely expedient. However, many studied 
crucial relations and zones of capital conversion.' 
As the more advanced industrial processes were absorbing sophistication, capital sav- 
ing mode was turning into a capital displacing mode of production. It started with less 
capital units of input for more product units of output, and proceeded down to a retreat 
of capital from production process. 
Labor displacement had been the subject of multiple studies since the Industrial Rev- 
olution. In the succeeding 100 yearsg, labor productivity increased approximately five 
5There was no notice of such a contingency in previous theories except a brief prediction by K. Marx 
in the first part of the 3rd volume of his Capital (Chapter Savings Due to Inventions). At a mature stage, 
industry could proceed from the capital dependent mode of production to another one, less dependent 
down to an (almost) independent driven instead by technologically (productively) applied knowledge. 
This speculation was revitalized by a variety of contemporary scholars. Some of them went so far as 
suggesting alternation for capital, in most cases as "knowledge" or in a similar (but broader) grasp as 
"human capital". 
Some scholars who recommended studies of "technological accumulation" and tried to prove it superior 
to theories of capital accumulation, referred to K. Marx as the first protagonist of this theoretical set- 
ting. Source: J., Cantwell, 1989, Technological Innovation and Multinational Corporations, B. Blackwell, 
Oxford, p. 7-8. 
'The remarkable impact of microelectronics stemmed from the contradictory development of its basic 
active parts. For instance, in the case of the chip in 10 years, technical capacity (number of transistor 
units per chip) was augmented more than 100,000 times, while the cost of a transistor unit declined 
1,000 times. Now, another order of magnitude has been achieved both in technical capacities as in cost 
reduction. 
7 ~ h i s  is understood as a set of diverse studies of technology clusters, inter-firm linkages, spatial 
organization, etc. One of the newest and well-informed papers asserts: "Technological innovation is 
increasingly a product of social innovation . . ." which amounts to "new logics of production organization" 
not based on capital strength only but "upon divergent organizational forms of collective knowledge 
appropriationn. Source: R. Gordon, 1989, Production Systems, Industrial Networks and Regions, Silicon 
Valley Research Group (together with Groupe de Recherche Europken sur le Milieux Innovateurs, Paris), 
Associazzone Italiana di Scienzie Regionali, Rome, p. 26. 
'Unique so far is an empirically grounded (for the period 1960-1975 in the US industry) and theoret- 
ically generalized study on capital conversion from Czechoslovakia (J. Jirasek, 1979, ~voln'ova'n~ kapita'lu 
(Capital Displacement), Institute for Philosophy of the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, Prague). In 
a congenial way, however, without giving the finishing touch, approach studies of the Institute for Global 
Economy and International Relations of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, on the current change of 
the capital-proneas of industrial production. For instance, A.P. Mileykovski et al., 1975, Ekonomicheskiy 
rost v usloviyakh monopolisticheskogo kapitalizma (Economic Growth in Monopoly Capitalism), Nauka, 
Moscow. Strangely, as far as we know, there is still no corresponding Western study. 
'Most scholars and experts did not come over the capital saving concept. For instance the last 
estimates of the US Congrewional Budget Office (CBO) for the economic development in the 1970s and 
1980s extrapolated into the 1990's forecast state: "Technological progress can improve the quality of 
capital goods and thereby increase labor productivity, even when the quantity of capital is unchanged" 
times, an industrial wonder that was never repeated since. But the retreating variable 
capital was substituted by increased fixed capital. 
After 200 years, fixed capital began to be complemented and substituted by ("capi- 
talized") scientific and engineering knowledge, industrial culture, inter-business synergy, 
etc. That tendency could not be taken in absolute terms, but as a contemporary ten- 
dency which may stretch over many decades (and probably hundreds of years) of ongoing 
industrial development. 
Capital proves an exciting propensity to self-sustained growth. Anything in his range 
grows, attains augmented quantitative as well as qualitative scope, and enters an ampli- 
fying and expanding reproduction process. However, several other phenomena dispose of 
similar reproductive "elan vital"; for instance, science and in wider understanding knowl- 
edge is increasingly self-productive. In a still wider concept, it is spiritual culture which 
also incessantly grows and ramificates. Among the last breakthroughs information (as 
substrate of informatics) could be introduced under this common term. 
These changes have been recurring on an expanding basis. They were more localized 
or regionalized in the past, however at present, their dimensions are increasingly global. 
They are nurtured from multieconomic and multicultural sources and can be presented 
in complex combinations. Another border has been passed in the conquest of the "round 
globen. 
Far from being obvious, this drift to capital displacement entails some principal eco- 
nomic deliberations. If proven by further studies, this designates capital's gradual retreat 
from its position and role in the production process. Capital will no longer be sufficient, 
in combination with labor, to assure growth. Other production factors come to the fore 
as indispensable ingredients, such as science, knowledge and skills, design culture, clients 
enlightenment, etc., in a very direct way. 
Systems science in the economic sphere should pay more attention to the contingent 
interdependence and creative combinations of such authoritative contemporary factors, 
such as human, scientific (knowledge), environment, and international factors. Fostered 
by technological advancement, economics is compelled to close relations with sociology, 
cultural studies, ecology, politology, and other segments of knowledge. 
Signals, that capital, moving free in the market, no more adequately serves some 
societal needs, come from some other spheres of societal activities. For instance, at tempts 
to establish a "self-service society", proclaimed by a number of scholars, prove how several 
societal needs lay off the capital and market interests.'' 
Economic growth can be no more explained through simple association of capital with 
labor. In the 1960s, the theory of growth was already induced to appropriate a "residual 
factorn responsible for a growth pace beyond the direct contribution of capital and labor. 
Later, this factor was deciphered as a set of specific factors, such as enterpreneurship, 
management, applied science, social organization, etc. 
2 Critical Issues of Theoretical Thought 
Conventional theories ceased to explain the logic of industrial process mainly because 
they were stuck exclusively or predominantly to "linear and algorithmic reduction". 
(Economic Impact, USIA, Washington, DC, 199012, p. 56). 
1°Examples: old, disabled and chronically ill people attendance; children from divorced marriages care, 
education and entertainment (substituting the missing parent); local environment care; inter-family coop- 
eration; combined transport in personal cars, etc. (A. Matzner, 1983, Gesellschaflliche Selbstbedienung, 
Frankfurt, a.M., Econ.). 
The thrust of their approach to reality highlighted simplified quantitative concepts 
of relations and linkages within a materialist and formalist descriptions of structures, 
input-output flows, product cycle consecutive stages, intra-firm organizations, etc. 
The post-war theories of industrial modernization mostly interpreted industrial progress 
in terms of technological determinism involving changes in the technical division of labor 
and structure of industrial institutions. 
It was broadly subsumed that technological change would dominate in a socioeco- 
nomic environment with cross-cultural, cross-national, and social convergence to egalitar- 
ity. Therefore microeconomic studies could have been scattered into individual cases of 
firms or branches (sectors) of industry and treated as goals for local optimization. 
In the pre-war and post-war studies emphasis was focused on large oligopolies, in 
particular, on multinational corporations (MNC). They proved to be a highly performative 
formation in the era of 'big sciencen. J. Galbraith, the "father of corporate economicsn 
welcomed MNCs as the most appropriate form of technology promotion. Market can be 
to a large extent substituted by studies undertaken by the MNC Utechno-structuren and 
internalized in the large firms." 
In the post-war period, small and medium-size business proliferated. After J.K. Schu- 
macher published his 'small is beautiful", microeconomics turned more to the issues of 
non-corporate business. In that segment of business, most new innovations were found, 
highest contribution to job formation, considerable flexibility and customizing ability. 
In a variety of studies small was opposed to big. In the 1960s and 1970s, dichotomies 
of business promotion were contrasted as small size versus big size, 'fordistic" versus 
flexible mode of production, "mechanofacture" versus Usystemofacturen ,economy of scale 
versus economy of scope, product standardization versus product diversification, "vertical 
organizationn versus 'horizontal organizationn, localization (or regionalization) versus 
globalization, etc. Strange enough, theoretical conclusions suggested opposite options as 
equal. 
Microeconomic theory, faced with unprecedented phenomena of high technology, tried 
to explain continuously the changed industrial pattern recurring to the conventional quan- 
titative approach, algorithmic simplification, and linear dichotomy of recommendations. 
Technological determinism, as verified in the past, suggested to treat the ongoing 
changes as functions of technical shifts in production, as gradual development stages of 
the same production process and looking for the formulation of the handy comparative 
advantage. 
Many new terms were introduced which assisted in understanding the change, how- 
ever most not sufficiently explained. The volatility of terms dwindled between empirical 
findings, ideal models or claimed normatives. 
Sometimes, but not rarely, theories were focused on one kind of factors, leaving uncon- 
cerned others (or 'ceteris paribusn). The conclusions were offered that other participating 
factors and socioeconomic environment be reconsidered (relying upon the decision maker's 
individual knowledge, experience, intention or fantasy). 
The dualism in explaining high technology's business effects was vigorously questioned 
in many newer works. For instance, a variety of studies suggested that in the haydays of 
fordism, small and medium-size business not only preserved its role, but reached higher 
levels. Now that small and medium-size business is praised, many facts support the finding 
that the role of MNCs and other big oligopolies do not diminish and have been amplified 
in several industries. 
"Three years ago, when lecturing in Prague, J .  Galbraith admitted that he had not rightly judged the 
risk of bureaucratization which later became true. 
The first to propose this duality was J.R. Schumpeter in the 1930s and 1940s. Both big 
monopolies, and small and medium-size firms may assure their prosperity in the area of 
technology advancement. Older theories isolated crucial components from their complex 
fabric socioeconomic relations, and tried to work out simple formulas for action. They 
progressively became alienated from the realities of modern industrial life. 
Their cognitive structure precluded their association with fundamental transformat ion 
of industrial development, such as innovative strive and continuous improvement as well as 
low predictability of economic, social and environmental, and regional or global mutations. 
Newer theories try to overcome the overlapping dichotomy and unify the opposite roles 
of small and big into a more general concept. They study the interdependence of both 
and disclose their generic interlinks. Small and big do not exclude each other, and they 
fill up logical functions. The border between them does not seem as stiff as it was in the 
past. 
Several facts provide evidence how small firms grow or join big ones, and also how 
big firms disintegrate and found small firms. Hewlett and Packard started as the first 
"garage enterprise" that became successful. So did Apple and many others. Meanwhile, 
other small firms surrounded those big producers supplying them specialities.12 Ten years 
ago, there was not any single biotechnological firm employing more than 100 engineers and 
workers. Today, big chemical concerns have established new divisions for biotechnology 
and harvested its benefit on a large scale.13 
Production firms, marketing networks, R&D facilities, manufacturing plants, and sales 
and services form productive systems. The present division of labor within those systems 
is not dichotomic (either - or), but interdependent, complementary, and associative. 
High Technology 
"High technologies" appeared in early 1980s. Science-based technological breakthroughs 
reached a remarkable volume and became topic of studies. The title "high" was used 
already before that for conspicuous, advanced, and expanding novelties. 
4 Technical, Organizational and Economic Ident ifi- 
cation of High Technology 
The term "high technology" is frequently used, however, not well defined so far. Most 
studies identify the gist of high technologies by their above average share of R&D (R&E) 
cost or of scientist and engineers participating in the production.14 Some also by the 
above average pace of development. 
Generic links join high technologies to science. They cluster around prominent sci- 
entific findings.'' However, they diffuse by cross-fertilizing processes (burn-in, spin-off, 
12A taxonomy of frequent forms of cooperation are introduced in the Working Paper Cooperative 
Busineas Strategies, IIASA, 1990. 
131n the 1980s "enterpreneuralism", that is enterprising enclaves inside the corporations or companies 
were constituted. 
14As a matter of fact, high technologies are picked up from industrial nomenclatures according to 
the prevailing character of respective branches. Examples are semi-conductors, computer technology, 
telecommunication, aircraft and spacecraft, biotechnologies, extreme materials, etc. 
''The OECD identifies all high technologies into the following sectors: semi-conductors, communica- 
tion, informatics, biotechnology, new materials. 
hybridization, etc.). Indirect application of science accounts for the vast majority of high 
technology industrial achievements. 
Most high technologies appeal to creative thinking, but there are also some dependent 
on smart shop floor adaptations. Therefore a number of high technologies have found 
adequate manufacturing conditions in NIC or even in developing countries. 
The sophistication of high technologies appeals to the "brainn, to research and de- 
velopment or experimentation, engineering culture and commitment, information flow, 
etc. High technologies unleashed an unprecedented rate of non-market (however, market- 
bound) forms of interfirms alliances and coordination. 
There are several reasons for the amplification of cooperative business. All industrial 
revolutions reformulate the way to progress. In the last decades the concept of "one best 
wayn was subject to serious criticisms and almost disappeared from the scene.16 
Another closely related reason consists in overlapping technological competition. Tech- 
nologies formerly separated became interconnected and developed jointly in diverse mu- 
tualities (parallelism, complementarity, intersection, hybridization). 
A sizeable segment of high technologies employs the modular (aggregate) principle 
of design. This is in particular true of semiconduct ers, programmable automation and 
robotics, computer and communication technology, and aircraft or spacecraft technology. 
Modularity renders it possible to combine and assemble autonomous modules (aggregates) 
which at the same time unbinds the stiff chain of production. 
Microeconomics formulated three principal opt ions: either a hierarchial conglomera- 
tion, organizational intra- firm reshaping, or inter-firm relations. The latter collaborative 
models transcend the conventional repertoire of discrete intra-firm closed product cycles 
or sell-buy market transactions. 
After the stagnation of the 1970s, collaborative strategies seemed to be the response 
to the risk of restrained markets. However, the collaborative option consolidated and the 
surge continues.17 
In many cases, the collaborative behavior is the second best (and will tend to reverse 
to a more conventional option). Still more often it proliferates as the preferred attitude, 
encompassing not small and medium-size firms but large corporations, too.'' 
5 Socio-cultural and Ecological Identification of High 
Technologies 
It is recommendable to round off the identification of high technologies taking into con- 
sideration other than technical parameters. The rapid increase of high technologies is 
supported by their remarkable social, cultural and environmental impact. High technolo- 
gies' unique human and ecological potential graduate them to attract a particular concern 
of scholars, policymakers, and public. 
16~us t  an illustration of expanded variety of technical solutions: industrial welding some 40 years ago 
disposed of some 4-5 basic methods. Now, in the electrical welding only, there are more than 300 varieties 
of the basic method which were unknown before. 
''The growth of collaborative arrangements increased in the 1980s in Europe 20 times, between the 
US and Europe 10 times, Japan and Europe 8 times and the US and Japan 4 times (J. Jirasek, 1990, 
Cooperative Business Strategies, Working Paper, IIASA). 
181n the present context particularly, neither firms nor industries exist completely as discrete entities 
exhibiting fixed and definite boundaries and rationally organizing their relations with other firms or 
sectors on the basis of contractual prices (R. Gordon, op cit., p. 13). 
High technologies first of all are turned less to the hands but more to the heads of 
workers alluring not only trained but educated people. They are apt to surmount the 
one-sidedness of conventional division of labor and work operations. An inventive and 
performative personality appears no more like a distant socio-cultural ideal, but more like 
an indispensable socio-cultural component of the "high manufacturingn. 
Next to that, high technologies prove to be more environment friendly and less nature 
depleting than the conservative industrial technologies. They can operate in the zone 
of "low mass and energy" and "low waste" production,lg better utilize the substrate of 
fuels, power and raw materials, appropriate natural stuff and procedures, etc. Many 
high technologies are already designed with the target to alleviate waste deployment and 
recycling. 
The current technological development leaves much to be improved. No country dis- 
poses of the sum of technologies that could be generally adopted on a global basis. Not 
only because they are expensive and require an advanced cultural level (and therefore less 
accessible for developing countries), but also because they cannot be expanded beyond 
present available world resources.20 
The outstanding human and ecological potential of high technologies is so far being 
disclosed only partially. Despite their attractiveness, they are still peripheral in relation 
to the whole industry.21 
6 Implications for Systems Research 
Contraversions between new realities and conventional theories degrade the acumen of 
industrial economics. Decision making finds itself deprived of reliable arguments and 
exposed to pragmatic situational procedures. 
The substantial lesson derived from contemporary studies about high technology im- 
pact on economy and business appears to be that in reality the market, R&D, manu- 
facturing, supply and sales or financial linkages are far more complex and diverse than 
their reducible assumptions would allow. Also that the former borders between macro- 
economics and micro-economics, or between economy and business cease to be that much 
distinct as the orthodoxy would admit. 
In the end, the theoretical scene induced by increasing high technology is not prin- 
cipally different from the changed common paradigm disclosed by the advancement of 
science22, and by "new thinking"23 in practical negotiations. 
High technology does not set up diverging trajectory of systems research, but it relies 
upon an updated systems concerned as a specifically salient support in policy and decision 
making: alteration of conventional monistic deterministic assertions proceeds toward a 
- 
l g ~ h e  objective of low material inputs and low waste outputs was primarily challenged from the point 
of view to overcome scarcity of supply or high prices. However a t  the outcome it turned over to higher 
sophistication. Most "low" (input) technologies are in themselves "high" technologies. 
''It has been estimated that a global application of the present advanced technology would demand 
2-3 globes for fuel and raw materials supply and 1 globe for waste deployment and also almost 1 globe 
for supplementing "gastarbeiters" (low skilled labor). 
"NO country exceeds some 5% of high technology's share. 
"In the theoretical branch, I have in mind, for instance, the discoveries made in "post-Prigogine" 
physics and chemistry, in life sciences (gene manipulation) and in ecology, in methodology the advance- 
ments in potentiality, turbulence and chaos studies. 
23The phenomenon of "new thinking" was introduced firmly in politology, mainly in international 
affairs. However, it should be extended to other paradigms as an active reflection of the changed "scientific 
image of the world". 
new set of pluralistic and non-deterministic conceivements. New theories look not only 
for the real state of affairs (events) but more for their potential (integral ability). 
In a simplified version the move of the theoretical thought may be presented as a 
gradual change of paradigms (demonstrated on some key terms).24 
"Fixismn Probabilism Possibilism Generalism 
Fixed Probable Possible, Plausible, conceivable 
potentid 
Well-defined Well-defined intervd Fuzzy Turbulent, chaotic 
Causdity Teleology Common tendencies 
Defining Searching 
Sure Risk Uncertainty 
Regularity Exploration, 
creation 
Data Informat ion Knowledge Met aknowledge 
This shift in knowledge engineering25 provides revealing opportunities for a more re- 
alistic explanation of whole classes of very dynamic events and processes. It can, among 
others, illuminate new horizons of economic and business problems. 
While the formal (mathematico-logical) interpretation involves complex procedures 
and is seldom met in practice, it draws attention to many non-conventional approaches 
and brings about a revitalization of practical policymaking and decision making. 
The loosening of orthodox determinism is on the other side balanced by the enhance- 
ment of usubjective factor", i.e., by inventiveness, creativity and thrust of the enter- 
preneur, company leader, manager, or professional expert. 
In theory, flexible procedures flourish, such as alternative deliberations, scenarios gen- 
erating, reveral detecting, exploring and searching, and prognostics. Altogether, previous 
mechanical treatment and processing of facts have been replaced by more creative ap- 
proach to reality. Pre-eminently quantitative mode of speculating26 is being combined 
with qualitative assessments. 
7 Writ ical Mass" and Collaborative Models in High 
Technology Industries 
High technology displays a diversified pattern of successful cases. (As well as many- 
around one- third-bankrupt cies.) 
24More on comparison of probabilism and possibilism in: M. Vitek, Possibilist Computation in Knowl- 
edge Engineen'ng, in: M.M. Gupta and T. Yamakawa, eds.: Fuzzy Computing, N. Holland, Elsevier, 
1988. 
25Another light may be thrown on this change from the point of view of the information theory. Since 
the 19408, the term "information" penetrated the theoretical deliberations, mainly in association with 
C. Shannon's theory of information (in particular) and N. Wiener's cybernetics (in general). The former 
initiated the measurement of information and introduced it into programmable technology, the latter 
endowed it with broad conceptual framework for controlling machinery and bioprocesses. 
2 6 ~ h e  quantitative approach has been supported by the massive introduction of formal algorithms and 
computer data processing. A new fetishization of the "growth" concept (as equal to progress) followed. 
Contemporary empirical studies (based on an already extensive practice) reinforce the 
belief that there is not a specific configuration and size of industries and firms related to 
high technology. Neither large corporations, nor small-scale firms, neither vertical (intra- 
firm), nor horizontal (inter-firm) interlinks, neither organizational nor economic (market) 
mechanisms exclusively favor or disadvantage the birth and growth of high technology. 
The flux of innovations does not depend on a single sort of resources, neither on 
a strictly regulated diffusion process. Innovation stems often from R&D achievements 
however most frequently it evolves through several improvements and finally looks for 
R&D support. Innovation variates as reciprocal effect and cause of R&D.27 
The majority of innovations (related to the number not to their historical sway) re- 
sults from combinations across the industries. Subjects of innovative drive extend from 
fundamental science over R&D (R&E), engineering and skilled workers in the industry, 
to clients   consumer^)^^ and public initiatives. 
Still, there are some findings which entail more conclusive orientation in the field of 
high technology constitution. As a rule, the process of technology accumulation depends 
on a variety of choices and initiatives from available resources and on synergy of activities 
(both in the range of the firm). 
Along with innovation and its implementation in manufacturing, other concerns have 
to be also taken into consideration, like marketplace potential, client or customer expec- 
tations (or behavior), flexible financing and capital investment, and others. Technological 
breakthroughs, progress and dominance are scarcely a genuinely scientific or technical 
task. The specificity of market absorption and diffusion is a usual organic part of the 
deal. 
The stimulating impact of synergy (of creative forces and resources) can be best 
achieved either through a spatial convergence or through information circulating and 
supply or subcontract logistic. There again is no exclusive choice but offers several op- 
tions. 
One of the rules, which really matters, though not adequately attended to, is the 
rule of the "critical mass". Borrowed from physics, it identifies an inter-stage position of 
the mass, a threshold volumes preparing a change. In economics it habitually appears 
associated with the amount of creative forces, technical means and capital indispensable 
to launch a breakthrough. 
High technology is especially perceptive to critical mass of creative resources, interlinks 
and negotiations. It is due to this feature of development that the burn-in, spin-off or 
original creation constitute a specific pattern of social (socio-cultural) interdependence 
which cannot be easily substituted by informatics (in the intellectual sphere) or logistics 
(in the material sphere). This could explain why so many high technology firms tend to 
converge spatially. 
Large firms committed to high technology try to combine advantages of highly so- 
phisticated products with a large scale (or scope) economy. They substitute personal 
contacts and negotiations by information collecting, processing and circulating. Many 
MNCs are extremely successful in operating with relevant information and elevating the 
technological acc~mula t ion .~~ 
271n the framework of high technology the R&D concept frequently turns to R&E (E for experimenta- 
tion) pattern. 
281n many processes of customizing the products/services the client (customer) activates and partici- 
pates in innovations by requiring and combining products/services according to his specific needs, making 
selective decisions, improving the operations, etc. 
29K. Marx, who is credited to have initiated the theoretical reflection of technology accumulation, 
Three alternative models of high technology institutional shapes may be presented in 
brief in Table 1. 
Once again it must be remembered that a schematic presentation makes it easier to 
provide a survey, however, it tends to invigorate borders between prototypes, while in 
practice there are many transitive and inter-mingled forms. 
As a matter of fact, the transient character of institutional setting of high technol- 
ogy development should be viewed not only from the point of interfaces but of consec- 
utive stages of development (either toward singular inventiveness or toward mass diffu- 
sion). More than other phenomena in economics, high technology requires a "development 
thinkingn .w 
What conventional theories treated as disparate cases of high technology institutional- 
izat ion, appear to be "cry st allized" events of a development process. Their studies should 
be supported not only that much by special theories as by an integral theory embracing 
the whole industrial high technology as an evolving process. 
The "Silicon Valley" Phenomenon 
Penetration of scientific discoveries into the web of industrial relations, particularly in the 
U.S., initiated new industrial formations concerned with intensive technology accumula- 
tion. 
Among the first examples was the "highway 128" in the Boston area.31 Scientific 
(and technological) parks proliferated and they are as many in the American industry as 
some 150 for the time being. Borders between them frequently tend to disappear thus 
converting local parks into consistent zones. 
Most prominent became the case of Silicon Valley in California. The short story of 
the Silicon Valley is rich in lessons related to high technology both in a stimulating as 
well as in an admonishing sense.32 
In the Silicon Valley, some specific conditions and factors rendered local cooperation 
strategy as most rewarding. For some in that area, competition strategy was ruled out a 
priori. For a time, Silicon Valley was able to develop an integral ability for permanent 
change and accrued benefits associated with product sophistication. 
The intellectual coherence of conventional theories presupposed to treat innovation as 
an outer and random factor which eliminated the spatial context and deprived territorial 
coordinates of any productive potential. 
The growth of high technology in local context gave force to the opposite assump- 
tion that it was areal or regional environment where high technology conglomerates were 
encapsuled, which provided an unspecified but impacting "genius loci". In many newer 
remarked that the technological progress is firmly rooted as much in the intellectual heritage of the 
predecessors as in the cooperation of contemporal innovators. When modern science and engineering 
took its start, scientists and engineers were extremely restricted in professional communication. Most of 
them never travelled and were left with postal services. Nowadays, informatics and telecommunication 
(tele-informatics) open a possibility to intensify professional contacts and set an almost achievable goal 
to "know everythingn. 
30The difference is markedly represented in the German doublet of "seinn and "werdennl the develop- 
ment thinking is "werden"-prone, reflects particular issues as an interwoven sequence of events. 
311ndeed, there had been similar conglomerates much earlier, e.g., in Britain the steel and shipbuilding, 
in Germany the chemical and machine-tool industries, etc. 
32See contributions of the Silicon Valley Research Group or B. McSummit, J. Martin, The Silicon 
Valley Story, Konstanz, Artigas, 1989. 
Table 1. Three alternative models of high technology institutional shapes. 
I I1 I11 
Product Standard Changing standard Diverse and customized 
low labor share low labor share labor intensive 
Customer Mass Large groups Dispersed 
Production Mass Mass flexible Flexible 
type ( "flexible specialization") 
Ownership Corporate Corporate or 
company 
Manufacturing Large-scale Large scale 
or scope 
regular semi-regular 
multi-plant multi-plant, chain 
or "satellite" form 
Supply and Constant Semi-const ant 
subcontract selected from partly involved 
market offer 
Labor Low cost with Low cost with 
a small core of a core of high 
high skilled skilled 
Individual or 
partnership 
Small scale and scope 
(prevailing scope 
orientation) 
irregular 
single plant 
Changing, negotiated 
highly involved 
Core of high skilled 
with low cost for 
simple and repetitive jobs 
Interlinks Information and Information and Personal negotiation 
communication communication 
network network with personal 
contacts 
Spatial Not important Partly important Locally (or sectorally) 
relations converging 
studies "area (or region) variables" were introduced in order to explain the unusual vigor 
of high technology industry. 
The resourcing of the high areal or regional creative potential is attributed to advanced 
universities, research and experimental bodies, advanced expertise, professional associa- 
tions, craft traditions, also venture capital opportunities down to a specific lifestyle and 
local a m e n i t i e ~ . ~ ~  
Many attempts to imitate the Silicon Valley model failed. Their failures demonstrated 
that "mere existence of requisite locational factors does not incubate dynamic high tech- 
nology growth. Contiguity does not generate industrial synergy" .34 
There is no simple, straight and immediate correspondence between specific types of 
production and spatial organization. Agglomerated firms do not necessarily maintain links 
with each other. Several of them obtain outside resourcing. Silicon Valley "importedn a 
number of low cost labor from other regions (and also from abroad). In the last decade, 
the agglomeration depends more on foreign capital. 
The life cycle of Silicon Valley had started with urgent need to foster information 
technology for military purposes. The emergence of Silicon Valley coincides with the 
advent of the VLSI chips. The development was heavily subsidized by governmental 
grants and investments. (This decisive instillment of knowledge and capital passed in 
many studies into oblivion.) 
Semi-conductor manufacturers moved into high performance equipment and control 
systems. After a time, equipment domination encapsuled the semi-conductor manufac- 
turing. Recurring crises in Silicon Valley (rather sensitive to oscillations in the market 
and capital supply) accelerated a vertical combination of leading firms. 
At present, Silicon Valley is no more an agglomeration of small scale firms but a blend 
of them with larger companies and MNC's affiliations. It was through them that Silicon 
Valley became internationalized. The famous high technology agglomeration reaps super- 
profits partly from its advanced sophistication and partly from hegemonic position of 
participating MNCs in the world market. 
However, a great deal of the Silicon Valley advantages, the cooperative arrangement 
of the industry, remains preserved. Partners are putting together their knowledge, co- 
production, capital in order to achieve more than instrumental market selling and buying 
relations may provide. 
Conventional cost minimizing and benefit maximizing hardly can highlight the "shared 
myopian of knowledge, learning, inventiveness, or capital venturing, that ranges beyond 
any single firm perspective. On the opposite side, conventional approach does not outline 
the principal virtues of different firms and their participation in the local myopia, either. 
Spatial socio-cultural context is obliterated and denied its part in high technology drive. 
High technologies respond mostly to market needs of product diversification, not that 
much to those of cost reduction (save for high manufacturing methods). They seek abun- 
dance of contact options which is their driving force for innovative behavior. 
Personal commitment and expertise develop for the most part along idiosyncratic 
trajectories of each firm but look for generic links to the dynamic turbulence of enhanced 
33Several theories were constituted to explain the development trajectory of high technology. Among 
them specific studies were devoted to spatial organization, capital investment thresholds, market tech- 
nology relations, product cycles, and division of labor. They were able to illuminate particular problems, 
however, mostly fell short of integral explanations. 
34R. Gordon, o.c., p. 9. This paper worked out by the Silicon Valley Research Group of the University 
of California jointly with the Group de Recherches EuropCen sur les Milieux Innovateurs (GREMI), and 
presented to the Xth Italian Conference of Regional Sciences, conveys many revealing ideas on the "Silicon 
Valley phenomenon". 
knowledge, industrial practice and enterpreneurial audacity. 
Informatics and communication can intermediate such links being looked for, and 
in many large firms, in particular MNCs, this is the way they operate. They are able 
to attract such permanent animating resources from vast spaces, in fact from global 
plethory. However, in agglomerations, similar resources bear a stimulating localized socio- 
physiological component. 
The last, so far, stage of Silicon Valley development is using a combination of local 
and global resources, supported by the involvement of international capital which is an 
obvious trend to a new structure of technological creativity, production flexibility and 
market saturation. 
There are also some lessons regarding the technology transfer from advanced industries 
into traditional industries. The majority of studies confirm that this technology transfer 
proceeds slowly, its intensity and scope are far from being satisfactory. At the same time, 
a more rudimentary enrichment of industrial technologies is pointed out as a paramount 
modernization potential. 
Traditional industries and their technologies need more compatibility with high tech- 
nology, starting with more information about that, more intimate contacts, and also more 
experimenting and learning. Both traditional and high technologies have to be concerned 
with working out common standards assuring component interchangeability and systems 
integration. 
There are several principal options of high technology development. The American 
model would recommend "flexible specialization", a downstream diversification of prod- 
ucts due to programmed automation. The Japan model makes use of advanced flexible 
manufacturing systems (FMS). The German model prefers what is called "flexible preci- 
sion manufacturing" relying on scientifically prepared engineers and high skilled workers. 
In addition, the Swedish (Scandinavian) model would involve group work organization. 
The Italian model is associated with the build-up of flexible production cooperative and 
town-centered chains. The Dutch model accentuates flexible logistics. And this choice is 
far from complete. 
All aforementioned models to different extent refer to high technology agglomerations. 
And they try to imitate the LLSilicon Valley approachn. A variety of high technology 
incubation and diffusion schemes have been outlined and tried in practice. 
As a duplicate of the U.S. scientific parks, similar formations are established in other 
parts of the world. Like technological centers in many European industrial areas, sci- 
entific and technological parks around scientific centers or newly founded scientific and 
technological terms35 (technopolis). 
By far not all of them prove to meet the initial expectations. Again it is being proved 
that mere spatial agglomeration without conceptual congruence does not match for an 
intensive technology acc~mula t ion .~~ 
The principal lesson from the Silicon Valley story is that the Silicon Valley was not 
only "foundn as a given local potential but that it was created by enterprising leaders, 
usually supported by public instillment of knowledge and capital. 
35E.g., scientific town Novosibirsk in the USSR, Sophia-Antipolis in France or Tsucuba Technopolis in 
Japan. 
36Analysis and generalization will be subject of a separate IIASA study. 
